ABSTRACT This paper will test the core claim of scholars in the nexus of contracts tradition -that private ordering as a process of bargaining creates optimal rules. We do this by analyzing empirical evidence in the context of waiver of liability provisions. These provisions allow companies to eliminate monetary damages for breach of the duty of care through amendments to the articles of incorporation. With all states allowing some form of these provisions, they represent a good laboratory to examine the bargaining process between management and shareholders. The contractarian approach would suggest that shareholders negotiate with management to obtain agreements that are in their best interests. If a process of bargaining is at work as they claim, the opt-in process for waiver of liability provisions ought to generate a variety of approaches. Shareholders wanting a high degree of accountability would presumably not support a waiver of damages. In other instances, shareholders might favor them in order to attract or retain qualified managers. Still others would presumably want a mix, allowing waiver but only in specified circumstances.
sufficient support. In other words, the regime would reflect "bargaining" between shareholders and management, with the goal of achieving the most efficient relationship.
If indeed some bargaining transpires between the competing interests, some degree of variance in practice would be expected. 10 While bargaining between competing interests is plausible in theory, in reality the management domination of the approval process and the severe problems of collective action confronted by shareholders make it all but impossible.
11 As a result, the process of management submitting matters to shareholders cannot accurately be characterized as bargaining in any meaningful sense of the term. It is management that drafts the proposal, management that has the authority to initiate, management that decides the most propitious moment to put forth the proposal, and management that has the corporate treasury at its disposal to ensure adoption. Moreover, once passed, shareholders typically lack the authority to initiate repeal. The consequences are stark -once management obtains adoption, the provision remains in place, irrespective of the wishes of shareholders, until management decides to initiate a change. This paper will examine whether the core claim of contractarians -that private ordering as a process of bargaining creates optimal rules -is borne out by the empirical evidence in the context of waiver of liability provisions. These provisions allow companies to eliminate monetary damages for breach of the duty of care through amendments to the articles of incorporation. With all states allowing some form of these 10 This is not to say that an efficient result that applies equally to all companies and all kinds of shareholders and managements should not be replicated in all companies. But for this to happen, it must be shown that the uniform result is the most efficient arrangement possible in all or most situations. If such a uniformly efficient arrangement cannot be crafted, variance has to be inevitable. 11 Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1411.
provisions, they represent a good laboratory to examine the bargaining process between management and shareholders. 12 The choice of waiver of liability provisions for study is particularly appropriate because they exemplify a contractarian approach to regulation. They were a reaction to purported problems created by a mandatory approach, and allowed companies to opt out of a regime that imposed liability on managers for breach of the duty of care. Moreover, as amendments to the articles, they require the assent of both managers and owners. The outcome, therefore, presumably results from negotiations between these two groups, and ought to be a good example of private ordering by contract.
If a process of bargaining is at work as the contractarians claim, the opt-in process for waiver of liability provisions ought to generate a variety of approaches. Shareholders wanting a high degree of accountability would presumably not support a waiver of damages. In other instances, shareholders might favor them in order to attract or retain qualified managers. Still others would presumably want a mix, allowing waiver but only in specified circumstances.
In fact, as the analysis will show, none of the diversity predicted by a private ordering model appears in connection with waiver of liability provisions. All states permit them. In the Fortune 100, all but one company has them. Moreover, they are remarkably similar in effect, waiving liability to the fullest extent permitted by law. In other words, one categorical rule was merely replaced by another, with no evidence that a categorical waiver of liability was any more efficient than a categorical rule imposing 12 Delaware originated the opt-in model, whereby companies could reduce liability by affirmatively amending their articles of incorporation. Indiana, some months earlier, adopted the first opt out model, whereby the statute eliminated monetary damages for grossly negligent behavior by the board but allowed companies to opt out of the regime in their articles of incorporation. See infra note 97.
liability. At the same time, the change benefited management, suggesting that the motivation was not efficiency but self interest of one of the interest groups involved.
Moreover, whatever one might think about the benefits of private ordering and bargaining, the evidence suggests that it is not taking place in the waiver of liability context.
This essay will do several things. First, it will briefly review the position of contractarians in the debate on the evolution of corporate law. The essay will then examine the impetus for waiver of liability provisions which, contrary to claims, was not from the excesses of Van Gorkom but from a disguised attempt to pass along some of the costs of D&O insurance to shareholders. Thereafter the essay will analyze the waiver provisions actually adopted by the Fortune 100 to determine whether the variance predicted by the bargaining model has occurred. Finally, the piece ends with some observations and identifies some of the reforms necessary to implement a private ordering model.
II. A Brief Exegesis on the Nexus of Contracts and the Race to the Bottom
A widespread view in the academy is that corporations are best analyzed as a "nexus of contracts." 13 As Professor Eisenberg notes, " [u] nder the nexus-of-contracts conception, the body of shareholders is not conceived to own the corporation. Rather, shareholders are conceived to have only contractual claims against the corporation." The corporation is created by a "nexus of reciprocal arrangements," 15 and the role of the law ought to be to facilitate this contracting process. 16 Managers, owners, and others bargain for the most efficient relationships, ones that uniquely reflect the interests of the particular parties involved.
While recognizing that managers have self-interested motivations to pursue their aims at the expense of the shareholders, contractarians rely on the "invisible hand" to constrain such behavior. 17 Investors will punish self-interested behavior by discounting the securities issued by those companies, thus presenting an effective incentive for managers to act in ways that maximize shareholder welfare. Over a period of time, companies having poor governance arrangements will be weeded out by the market, and those exhibiting optimal arrangements will thrive. Contractarians, therefore, favor enabling provisions where parties can opt in or out and eschew the "one size fits all" approach of categorical rules. 18 Corporate law, in their framework, should merely provide a set of default rules.
19
15 Id. at 822. Professor Eisenberg writes that "the nexus-of-contracts conception … neither can nor does mean what it literally says. In ordinary language, the term contract means an agreement. In law, the term means a legally enforceable promise. Pretty clearly, however, the nexus-of-contracts conception does not mean either that the corporation is a nexus of agreements or that it is a nexus of legally enforceable promises." Id. 16 not make a strong case. They are inconsistent in result 36 and short term in horizon, 37 offering no view on the long term impact. 38 They also conflict with the facts on the ground. To the extent reincorporation results in a predictable increase in share prices, the impetus for engaging in the transaction ought to come from financial experts. In fact, the literature indicates that they were promoted by lawyers, not investment bankers.
39
Finally, corporate law reform often has at its core managerial self interest rather than efficiency.
40
The debate over enabling versus categorical rules surfaced with a vengeance in the commentary surrounding the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley. 41 The Act summarily rejected the contractarian approach, adopting a host of categorical rules. 42 The response was a fusillade of criticism and invective, with at least one scholar labeling the Act 36 See Bebchuk, supra note 34, at 1791-92 ("These six studies . . . present a rather mixed picture. Roberta Romano's study, the earliest and most influential of the six, found a positive abnormal return of 4.18%. However, three of the subsequent five studies found abnormal returns in the vicinity of 1%, and two of the subsequent five studies, including the most recent event study which used the largest sample size, did not find an abnormal return that differed from zero in a statistically significant way.") (footnotes omitted). 37 They had to be approved by both directors and shareholders, presumably giving rise to a bargaining process.
The provisions replaced a categorical rule with an enabling provision, the very sort of arrangements contractarians favor. 47 They permitted private ordering, facilitating greater efficiency. 48 By requiring shareholder and management approval, the contractarian thesis would predict a multitude of variations in waiver of liability provisions, each designed to promote efficiency.
49
As the data will show, these "benefits" have not materialized. There has been no evidence of bargaining, no evidence of true private ordering. Instead, one categorical rule has merely replaced another. In other words, the empirical evidence shows implementation of a "one size fits all" approach, the very thing contractarians vehemently oppose. 50 The only difference is that the new categorical rule favors managers over shareholders. improving the terms of a corporate contract --by adding or deleting fiduciary duties where appropriate --will positively affect the price of the corporation's securities. This gives a control purchaser the opportunity to profit by changing the terms of the contract."). 49 As Roberta Romano has said: "State law is an enabling approach. It is a set of default rules. Sometimes firms opt out of them and sometimes they opt in, and I think that reflects the essential variation in firms about what they think is the best governance structure, the 51 Further, it is arguable that the waiver of liability provision is not in the nature of a default rule at all. As Professor Eisenberg notes, "[t]he standard methodology for establishing the content of a default rule is that the rule should have the content that the affected parties would have agreed upon if they had costlessly negotiated on the matter." Eisenberg , supra note 12, at 833. If this is indeed the test of a default rule, it would be strange to suppose that shareholders would negotiate with management to absolve directors of liability for breaches of their fiduciary duties. If the rule were that directors were personally liable for breaches of the duty of care, but the more efficient rule were to be that they should not be personally liable, the parties would contract around the rule to reach a more efficient outcome. This bargain around the rule can only occur to the extent that transaction costs are low. If the transaction costs are high, the parties would be forced to live with the inefficient categorical rule imposing personal liability. In such scenarios, a default rule absolving directors of personal liability would make sense. Let us consider whether such a rule might be more efficient. Shareholders would sue directors individually or jointly, and could elect to sue those with the deepest pockets leaving them to sue the others for contributions. In such circumstances, individuals with significant personal resources would decline directorships with the result that the board would be comprised of individuals with little or nothing at stake, possibly even by individuals who are in serious debt. Personal liability is of little avail in these circumstances because a successful shareholder would collect nothing. One could also contend that if personal liability were to be the rule, even good candidates who are mired in debt might shirk directorships, thus ultimately injuring shareholders by forcing them to accept less than ideal candidates as directors. Is waiver of liability the only option? Clearly not. It is entirely possible to externalize some of these risks -whether it be by insurance, limitations of liability, selective waivers, etc. If true bargaining was at work, one would expect to see a range of these outcomes, with the most efficient being replicated. What we have, instead, is waiver of liability to the fullest extent allowed by the law. This leads to the conclusion that the provisions are in the nature of pro-management categorical rules, rather than efficient default rules that the parties themselves might have designed had they been negotiating with low contracting costs. It is curious that contractarians have no problem with categorical rules when they are pro-management.
inevitable market correction. In fact, almost as the ink dried on the legislation, the D&O "crisis" ended. 52 At the same time, while having little or no impact on D&O insurance, the provisions did benefit managers by reducing their exposure to liability.
B.
Waiver of Liability: An Exegesis D&O insurance had, by the 1980s, become a fixture in the corporate board room.
As the decade opened, however, a "crisis" occurred. 53 In renewing their policies, companies often found that the costs had risen sharply, the exclusions increased, and the amount of coverage reduced. 54 The reasons for the crisis were varied, including traditional cycles that affected all types of commercial insurance.
55
One development that did not explain the "crisis," however, was the Supreme 73 See Honabach, supra note 87, at 324 ("The causes for the increased rates were multifold, but it became a popular, yet misguided, sport to point to the Van Gorkom decision as a major contributing cause."). Thus, Romano notes that: "Many factors contributed to the market's turbulence, including the expansion of directors' liability. 76 Balotti & Gentile, supra note 82 at 9 n.21 ("Among the proposals considered and rejected were amending § 145(b) to permit indemnification of judgments or amounts paid in settlement of derivative suits, amending § 145(g) to permit wholly-owned 'captive' subsidiaries to provide 'insurance' to the parent corporation, providing a statutory 'cap' for personal liability of directors, and providing an automatic statutory exemption from certain types of liability."). Other models were adopted in the early years. Roberta Romano has a thorough discussion of the development of these provisions. Despite the temporal proximity to Van Gorkom, the legislative history of the provision indicated that the impetus was the "crisis" in the D&O insurance market.
Section 102(b)(7) and the amendments to Section 145 represent a legislative response to recent changes in the market for directors' liability insurance. Such insurance has become a relatively standard condition of employment for directors. Recent changes in that market, including the unavailability of the traditional policies (and, in many cases, the unavailability of any type of policy from the traditional insurance carriers) have threatened the quality and stability of the governance of Delaware corporations because directors have become unwilling, in many instances, to serve without the protection which such insurance provides and, in other instances, may be deterred by the unavailability of insurance from making entrepreneurial decisions. The amendments are intended to allow Delaware corporations to provide substitute protection, in various forms, to their directors and to limit director liability under certain circumstances.
80
Aware that the "crisis" was economic in nature (reflecting increased costs of insurance), the legislative history attempted to link the reform to improved governance. Waiver of liability provisions would ensure a steady supply of qualified directors. 81 decision that appeared to sanction a corporate charter provision limiting liability."). 83 The number of law suits against directors apparently doubled between 1974 and 1984. Romano, supra note 53, at 1158. See also Griffith, supra note 104, at 688 n.210 ("First, the market was probably already in the early stages of an unavailability crisis, as government regulation was on the rise, and government and private lawsuits were around every corner."). 84 Premiums began to escalate even before the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Van Gorkom. 85 Yet oddly, Romano notes that the D&O insurance market had "changed dramatically" by 1984, with "premiums skyrocketing at the same time that coverage was shrinking and deductible increasing." She notes that "many factors" contributed to this increase "including the expansion of directors' liability" and describes Van Gorkom "as the most important case in this regard". See Roberta Romano, supra note 92 at 220-21. But Van Gorkom was decided in 1985, after the dramatic change and even she acknowledges that the crisis had largely passed by 1986, shortly after the decision was rendered. 86 During the period, for example, the costs of insurance increased for other types of liability, suggesting that the problem was industry wide. Romano, supra note 53, at 1161 ("D & O insurers did not respond to the enactment of limited liability statutes by lowering premiums, although the vast majority of corporations that had the opportunity to opt for these new regimes did so."). See also Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 31-32 (1989) ("Insurers did not respond to the enactment of these statutes by reducing 1987 policy rates, although many firms acted immediately to amend their charters."). Romano, who clearly favored the provisions, came up with two possible explanations. "First, the statutes in most states do not exempt from liability claims for breach of the duty of loyalty, violation of federal securities laws, and breach of the duty of care by directors who are also officers." Romano, supra at 1161. In other words, Van Gorkom and the duty of care had little impact on the D&O policies. "Second, and perhaps more important, the statutes' effectiveness will depend on how courts interpret them." Id. 87 As insurance companies proved better able to assess the risks associated with D&O insurance, premiums would presumably stabilize and additional carriers would enter the market. This is apparently what occurred. 88 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 62, at 507 ("The tightening of underwriting standards accompanies a 'hard market' in which premiums and, after a lag, underwriting profits rise. Increased underwriting profits, of course, spur competition, whether from new entrants or established companies seeking to increase
The purported concern over corporate governance was never established. While some anecdotal "evidence" indicated a growing number of resignations, 90 the evidence was never marshaled to show that this resulted from problems in the D&O insurance market or that adequate replacements were unavailable. 91 Indeed, some of the evidence suggested that directors quit not because of a threat of liability but because, in the aftermath of Van Gorkom, they had to work harder. 92 Moreover, even if the pool had declined, companies had a ready mechanism for correcting the imbalance: increasing directors' fees.
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The adoption of waiver of liability amounted to an overbroad response to the purported concerns about "uncertainty" in the application of the duty of care. The issues arising out of Van Gorkom could have been addressed in a more narrow fashion, 94 focusing, for example, on the basis for establishing an informed decision. 95 The market share, and competition leads to another 'soft market' of loosening of underwriting standards and declining profits. The process is described as cyclical because each market condition contains the seed to generate the other.") (footnotes omitted). 89 See also Romano, supra note 109, at 2 ("The turbulent conditions in the D&O insurance market persisted until mid-1986, when the rate of cost escalation and capacity reduction declined. While many corporations reported having difficulty in securing D&O insurance coverage in 1986, only a small number failed to resolve the problem." 7)). 91 For an excellent discussion of the paucity of data on this issue, see Nowicki, supra note 60, at 478-79. 92 See Silas, supra note 82. 93 Id. 94 The legislature could, for example, have increased the circumstances when directors could rely on the CEO or market price in making informed decisions. 95 For those companies putting in place a waiver of liability provision, actions seeking to impose liability for breach of the duty of care could be summarily dismissed. As the Delaware Supreme Court noted in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 2003) ("[U]nless there is a violation of the duty of loyalty or the duty of good faith, a trial on the issue of entire fairness is unnecessary because a Section 102(b)(7) provision will exculpate director defendants from paying monetary damages that are exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of care."). Lubben & Darnell, supra note 63, at 591 ("We answer the first question by tracing the waning of the duty of care-a rule that now requires little more of a director than a ritualistic consideration of relevant data. Today, after the director engages in this ritual, her decision will provision, however, went beyond the purported problems created by the decision, eliminating liability even in circumstances where no uncertainty existed.
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In other words, the Delaware legislature adopted waiver of liability provisions to cure an insurance "crisis" that was short lived, and likely structural, in order to prevent adverse consequences for the board of directors that were unproven. And, rather than fix the perceived concerns with Van Gorkom with a narrowly tailored approach, it opted for an overbroad solution that exonerated directors for breach of the duty of care in all circumstances. In short, it was a provision designed less to solve a real governance problem and more to use the surrounding din as cover to reduce director liability.
Waiver of liability did not, therefore, restore the D&O insurance market. It did, however, restore Delaware's pro-management position, something that had taken a beating in the aftermath of Van Gorkom. In other words, the "crisis" was little more than a cover for a substantial, pro-management change in fiduciary obligations.
97
Even as the insurance crisis dissipated, the other states passed copy-cat legislation. By corporate law reform standards, the speed with which the other states fell in line was nothing short of remarkable. states had some version of waiver of liability. 99 A modest number chose an opt-out approach, eliminating monetary damages for breach of the duty of care but allowing companies to reinstate damages through amendments to the articles. The vast majority, however, followed the Delaware model and relied on opt-in.
What could be the reasons? Not the D&O insurance crisis; that was over. 100 Not efficiency. Instead, it was designed to prevent companies from moving to Delaware.
101
In other words, whatever Delaware's motivation, other states adopted comparable provisions not because of improved governance or efficiency 102 but because of the need to benefit management and avoid reincorporation, with some evidence suggesting harm to shareholder values.
103 99 Romano has reported that it took only 14 years for forty-nine states to adopt some form of liability limitation. 100 In time, however, even Delaware stopped using the insurance crisis as the justification. 101 Romano, supra note 92, at 224 ("Commentaries by practitioners in several states refer to concern that firms would reincorporate if the state did not adopt a limited liability statute similar to the Delaware provision."). Romano also contends that the provisions were adopted because of "the perceived insurance crisis". Id. at 221. States that followed on the heels of Delaware could perhaps claim with a straight face that they acted in response to the "perceived" insurance crisis. But, surely, such a claim would be stretching credulity for those acting several years after. 102 Some have tried to argue that these provisions arose not out of self interest but efficiency. Roberta Romano notes that the provisions are "uniformly approved by shareholders" and that the evidence "suggests" that investors find the Delaware approach "attractive." Having the provisions, she surmises, is "consistent" with "attracting higher quality outside directors." Interestingly, she has apparently abandoned other rationale used in the past to argue that these provisions are really beneficial. See Romano, supra note 53, at 1156 ("But the most popular reform, limited liability statutes, most likely will prove to be beneficial for shareholders, by eliminating a class of lawsuits where insurance payouts defray legal costs rather than compensate shareholders, and any deterrent effect is quite problematic."). See also Honabach, supra note 87, at 312 ("Some also believe that both the enactment of section 102(b)(7) and the individual corporate decisions to add an exculpatory provision to corporate charters resulted in a loss of shareholder value."). As for attracting outside directors, there is simply no evidence that companies have trouble attracting these types of
IV. The Corporate Response
The conclusion that Delaware authorized waiver of liability provisions to restore its pro-management reputation does not necessarily preclude a finding of increased efficiency. 104 The Delaware model relied upon an opt-in approach. The approach would theoretically allow owners and managers to bargain for the most efficient arrangements.
In practice, however, this has not been the case. 105 The "opt out" approach used by the statute places exclusive authority in the hands of management to institute a waiver of liability provision and to draft the appropriate language. Structured as amendments to the articles, only the board can initiate the change. 106 The monopoly over initiation effectively bars shareholders from opting back into the default regime. 107 Management, therefore, can pick the most propitious moment to make a proposal, and once in place, directors, with or without waive of liability provisions. With expanded indemnification, D&O insurance (no more crisis there), and director fees that can run over a half a million dollars, it can be argued with a straight face that, absent waiver of liability, a large public company would have trouble obtaining enough qualified outside directors. 104 The repeal on size limits just before the turn of the 19 th century may have arisen from self interest but resulted in improved efficiencies. 105 See McChesney, supra note 79, at 648-49 ("As shareholders confronted the implications of Van Gorkom, a second development was predictable. In the contractarian model, faced with a decision that swept away existing contracts between shareholders and their management, competing state legislatures would seek to restore the value-maximizing status quo ante. Delaware's imposition of an inefficient law (one whose costs exceeded its benefits) created a profit opportunity for politicians in other states to install rules guaranteeing that Van Gorkom could not happen in their jurisdictions. That competition would force Delaware to mitigate the effects of the inefficient rule it created."). 106 But see Publicly Traded Corporations Act, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-01 et al (2007) (providing shareholders of public companies with the right to initiate amendments to the articles of incorporation). 107 See Bebchuk, supra note 45, at 502 ("On most important issues, corporate law requires companies wishing to opt out of a default arrangement to do so by amending their charters. Charter amendments, in turn, require approval by shareholders representing a majority of the outstanding shares. Shareholders can only act, however, on the basis of proposals put forward by the board of directors. Shareholders can never initiate charter amendments, and the board thus enjoys a veto power over such amendments.") (footnote omitted). This is critical. Even if management is eventually replaced, the new set of directors would presumably want to retain the waiver of liability provision and would, therefore, be unlikely to initiate an opt out process. It should be noted that Pennsylvania allows the provision to be included in the bylaws which may permit shareholder initiation. 585 (1996) ("Relatedly, one should not forget that managers control the process by which such opting out terms are constructed, implemented, and priced. Managers or their agents typically bear responsibility for drafting the opt-out provisions, and typically mangers establish the process through which the corporation or the corporate constituencies 'consent' to the opt-out provisions."). 110 Others have noted the problem with suggesting that a corporation is a nexus of contracts, negotiated by the relevant parties. See Brudney, supra note 11, at 1412 ("It stretches the concept 'contract' beyond recognition to use it to describe either the process of bargaining or the arrangements between investors of publicly held corporations and either theoretical owners first going public or corporate management. Scattered stockholders cannot, and do not, negotiate with owners who go public (or with management --either executives or directors) over hiring managers, over the terms of their employment, or over their retention."). 111 See Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Shareholder Proposal (Form DEF 14A), (July 29, 1996) ("RESOLVED: The shareholders of Archer Daniels Midland Company urge the Board of Directors to take such action as is necessary to provide for directors personal monetary liability for acts or omissions that constitute a breach of a director's fiduciary duty of care resulting from gross negligence."). 112 See McChesney, supra note 79, at 649 ("Shareholders have overwhelmingly responded to the opportunity by adopting the director-protecting charter amendments permitted by these new statutes. So has been restored the status quo ante in corporate law: virtually a zero-chance of liability for directors in dutyof-care cases."). 113 Thus, for example, management with surly shareholders ready to oppose the provisions might wait until reincorporation when shareholders will be denied a straight up or down vote on the provision.
With these predictions in mind, let us turn to the empirical evidence. Many have already noted the popularity of waiver of liability provisions. 114 No one, however, has studied the phenomenon systematically. 115 We have chosen as the initial universe for examination the Fortune 100 in the 138 Others contain indemnity provisions in addition to waiving liability: "[the] corporation shall, to the fullest extent permitted by law, indemnify any and all officers and directors of the corporation, and may, to the fullest extent permitted by law or to such lesser extent as is determined in the discretion of the Board of Directors, indemnify any and all other persons whom it shall have power to indemnify, from and against all expenses, liabilities or other matters arising out of their status as such or their acts, omissions or services rendered in such capacities. The corporation shall have the power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against such liability." Companies having similar clauses include Lowes. 139 The data is in contrast with evidence from a study of the charter provisions of companies listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange prior to the enactment of mandatory rules in 1936 conducted by Professor Whincop. An examination of one hundred and fifty charters and found that "[m]ost companies opt for a limited indemnity which does not extend to damages for negligence and adds little to the director's "default" indemnity rights." The evidence is markedly different from our results and shows that it might be reflective of some bargaining given the variance: "[l]iability releases are often qualified, but in standardised ways. The principal qualifications refer to "wilful default" or "dishonesty", 43.3% of the charters are qualified by reference to wilful default; 39.3% refer to "dishonesty"; 6% refer to both in the alternative. Only three liability releases were unqualified and none of these included the broadest form of release." He did find, however, that "a minority of companies opt for a more expansive indemnity, wide enough to include liability for negligence, [except] that the indemnity is not available where the liability arises from
The data shows that opting in does not transpire in the waiver of liability context. This is because of the difficulties imposed on shareholders who might want to engage in some type of negotiations. Realities on the ground make change difficult despite the presence of activist shareholders. Many of these difficulties are systemic.
First, only management has the authority to propose an amendment to the articles of incorporation. Directors can pick the most propitious time to propose a matter to shareholders.
The authority goes much further, however, than the power to propose. where a special committee of the board sought approval of a merger. When, shortly before the meeting, it became clear the proposal would fail, the committee authorized an adjournment. This occurred despite overwhelming opposition from shareholders for adjournment of the meeting.
Second, waiver of liability provisions can be implemented without the benefit of a direct shareholder vote. The waiver may be in the articles when the company goes public. 141 In other cases, they may be inserted into the articles when the company reincorporates, with shareholders stuck with approving the entire transaction, not each individual provision in the articles. A waiver of liability provision may also be approved in companies with controlling shareholders, making the opinions of the minority shareholders irrelevant.
Third, even when submitted for approval, shareholders confront the usual bevy of collective action problems. 142 They lack information, often a consequence of rational apathy. 143 To oppose management, they would need to lobby other shareholders, made expensive and difficult by the proxy rules.
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Fourth, a number of reasons make it less likely that shareholders will oppose a waiver of liability provision. One is the NIMBY phenomenon. 145 Another is path dependence. 146 Yet another is the me-too phenomenon. When one board has a waiver of liability provision to fall back on, every other board clamors for the same. With the provisions universally in place, shareholders would have to accept the consequences of denying the waiver to their management while all other large companies, including competitors, have the waiver in place. 142 Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1401 (1989) ("Although an amendment requires majority approval by the shareholders, voting shareholders do not have sufficient incentive to become informed. And although the amendment must be proposed by the board, the directors' decision might be shaped not only by the desire to maximize corporate value but also by the different interests of officers and dominant shareholders."). 143 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1575-76 (1989) ("A diffuse group of public shareholders must evaluate this claim against the possibility that the amendment is merely "wealth-neutral," because all or almost all of the gain inures to the insiders, or "wealth-reducing," because it will transfer cash flow or control from public shareholders to insiders. In these circumstances, shareholder voting as a means of evaluating and consenting to a proposed charter amendment is fraught with severe problems, in particular, collective action problems in acquiring and disseminating information among shareholders, and strategic behavior by insiders that amounts to economic coercion. Thus insiders can exploit their advantages to obtain approval even for wealth-reducing amendments.") (footnotes omitted). 144 Most of the provisions were adopted back in the 1980s and early 1990s, at a time when investor activism was not as developed. 145 Not In My Back Yard. Directors oppose attempts to remove waiver of liability provisions claiming that even if the idea is a good one, it is a reform that is not needed in their company. 
VI. Conclusion
The nexus of contracts approach is a worthy theoretical framework for the examination of issues relating to corporate governance. This is particularly true in emphasizing the importance of private ordering in the regulatory process. The usefulness, however, breaks down when the approach is used to explain the relationship 147 Shareholder opposition surfaces mostly in the context of matters that affect their economic interests. They will, therefore, more likely support changes that address issues of entrenchment and mismanagement. Shareholder proposals that most often pass over the opposition of directors, therefore, typically address anti-takeover devices or majority vote systems. 148 Kahan & Klausner, supra note 195, at 349. Kahan and Klausner have suggested "that corporate contract terms can frequently offer "increasing returns" as more firms employ the same contract term. Value arises from the common use of a contract term… as the use of a term increases, it becomes significantly more attractive (at least up to a critical point), and its attraction becomes self-perpetuating."
between diffused shareholders and management. There is little evidence in practice that the relationship between shareholders and managers can be accurately characterized as a process of private ordering. Instead, as this essay shows, when the law defers to private ordering, the result is that it allows management to impose on shareholders a categorical rule that embodies its self-interest. In the context of waiver of liability provisions, the approach has resulted in one categorical rule being replaced by another, precisely the opposite of what contractarians desire.
Thus, it would seem that the contractarian approach does not offer an adequate explanation for the situation with regard to waiver of liability provisions. Based on our evidence, the managerial model might offer better predictive power. Management would always want the reduced liability. Given learning and network effects, over time, such provisions would become universal. Management would also want protection to the fullest extent permitted. This would yield provisions consistent with the evidence that we have presented.
The evidence is consistent with a race to the bottom. The waiver of liability provisions were not designed to solve a corporate governance problem but were intended to provide a benefit sought by management. With management controlling the reincorporation process, they could and would move the company to Delaware to take advantage of the reduced liability. Other states, aware of this dynamic, quickly mimicked the approach, not because it promoted good governance or efficient behavior but because it prevented a flight to Delaware.
To have anything approaching an effective system of bargaining, the shareholder voting process must be meaningful. 149 Management must know that shareholders have the ability of vetoing or overturning an opt-in/out decision unless the interests of shareholders are taken into account. For this to work, therefore, there must be substantial reform of the shareholder voting process.
These reforms would need to do several things. First, shareholders would need equal authority with management to initiate an opt-in/out process or to initiate a change in a prior decision. To do this, all opt-in/out provisions would either need to be in the bylaws (with shareholders receiving explicit authority to initiate, change or repeal the bylaws) or if in the articles of incorporation, the authority to initiate an amendment to the articles.
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Second, shareholders would need to be given far broader authority to propose changes to the arrangements that constitute the nexus of contracts in any particular company. There are substantial areas of governance that are off limits to shareholders.
These typically arise in the context of proposals that could affect the management of the company. The argument that shareholders should not be allowed to micromanage the diurnal functioning of the company has been raised as the bogey to limit shareholder empowerment in areas that, at best, involve de minimus interference in the actual management of the company. Shareholders might condition support for a management inspired opt-in/out proposal on management support for additional shareholder authority, such as an advisory vote on executive compensation.
149 Thus, we disagree with Professor Bainbridge that the nexus of contracts theory compels an approach to corporate governance that requires a weakening of shareholder authority. 150 At least one state in narrow circumstances has given this authority to shareholders. See North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act, supra note 133.
Third, steps would need to be taken to solve some of the collective action problems that impede the shareholder approval process. These relate to organization and cost. Cost issues arise most clearly in the need to solicit proxies, an expensive and time consuming process. Liberal access to the company's proxy statement for shareholder proposals would be one way to reduce but not eliminate costs associated with collective action.
